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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

This testimony is a critique of the DFA/Dean proposals to tighten pooling requirements. I did this
for the country's largest milk broker, Ted Jacobi & Co. , St Louis, and a group of midwestern coops including Family Dairy Farms, the 4th largest co-op in the US (used to be called nationall
Farmers Union milk co-op), and some small fluid processors and cheese companies in Order 33.
My reasoning is as follows. Basically DFA/Dean has the fluid market pretty much locked up via
full supply contracts. By lowering the diversion limit, for example from 60% to 50%, milk
marketers who have 250 lbs of milk to sell to the midwest must shift from selling 150 lbs
manufacturing and 100 lbs fluid to 125 lbs each. For a cheese operator who needs the 150 for his
plant he must up sales of fluid to 150 lbs. If he does not do his farmers do not qualify for the pool
and blend price. Since DFA has the class fluid base pretty much locked up, these milk marketers
must go to DFA and pay for the added class 1 base that they need to keep their farmers pooled.
Industry sources say that DFA often "sells" it to them for half of the producer price differential
(the difference between the cheese price and the blend price). You might see Jeffry Leeman's
testimony at the same hearing on this point (available from John Vetne JohnVetne@verizon.net)
On cross examination the DFA attorney asked me how I knew and could say that some
members of the DFA led marketing agency in common, especially smaller co-ops , and some
small fluid processors that buy milk from the DFA system feel that they are disciminated against
in favor of the dominant firms (DFA and Dean and DFA/Natl Dairy Holdings).
My answer was "Don't you know that they are part of the coalition that have engaged me to testify
here? Why would they do so if they were happy with the DFA , Dean , NDH system?"
The lawyer sat down.
Note Exhibit 3 is the Wellington testimony on how Hood/NDH would have depooled Agri Mark.
Exhibit 2 also discusses the possiility, not the certainty, that Big Y got price reductions last year. It
is a very rational economic strategy. Even if it did not occur and it may not have , the world
needs to know that such moves can occur when the structure of the channel is as noncompetitive
as it is. Farmers are in a Ginger Bread boy position on the fox's head midstream.
Others in other parts of the country are very concerned about these types of power play.

I. Introduction
My name is Ronald Cotterill. I am a Professor of Agricultural and Resource Economics
at the University of Connecticut, and Director of University of Connecticut’s Food Marketing
Policy Center. My curriculum vitae has been marked as Exhibit No. 1. I have been asked by
John Vetne, attorney for White Eagle Milk Marketing Federation and other interested parties, to
analyze the impact of proposed changes to pool qualification rules on pricing conduct and the
economic performance of markets in Midwestern milk marketing channels. Proposal Number 2
at this Hearing would tighten pool performance standards by reducing the diversion limits for
Sec 9c. cooperatives and other handlers from 60% to 50% in each of the months of August
through February and from 70% to 60% in each of the months of March through July (Federal
Register, 2/17/2005, p. 8045). Pool supply and cooperative plants would also experience a
tightening of pooling standards, but the burden of these changes would fall more heavily on
supply plants because supply plants qualify for pool participation on the merits of the individual
plant’s conduct while cooperative plants qualify by paper designation based on the cooperatives
system-wide performance. Dean Foods has proposed additional, and more restrictive, pool
qualification rules.
Milk cooperatives and proprietary handlers have expressed concern throughout the U.S.
federal milk market order system about the impact of “paper pooling,” and of depooling in
response to nonfluid-use raw milk price volatility, on the stability, fairness, and logistical
efficiency of the order system. In response to these concerns, USDA has entertained a series of
proposals to tighten milk pool qualification standards in the federal milk marketing order system.
Leading proponents of these changes are Dairy Farmers of America, (DFA) the nation’s largest
milk cooperative, and Dean Foods, the nation’s largest fluid milk processor.
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As I reviewed the hearings and arguments of parties leading up to this hearing, I have
come to understand that “paper pooling” is an elusive concept. It is both an esoteric term of art
unique to the federal milk order system, and a term of derision employed to describe someone
else’s milk marketing practices. It always applies to milk used to make manufactured products
produced by dairy farmers that participate in the federal order milk pool by paper designation of
the reporting handler – usually a Section 9c cooperative association. However, only milk that is
delivered to a pool distributing plant must be pooled.

All other milk is pooled by paper

designation, whether it is a paper reporting diverted milk, a paper designating a cooperative plant
as a pool plant, or a paper agreement between a manufacturer and a cooperative in Order 33
allowing the Section 7e manufacturer’s plant to be pooled without plant-specific performance
(i.e., shipments to distributors). I see no functional difference between milk that is diverted day
after day to a nonpool cheese plant, and milk that is delivered day after day to Leprino’s 7e plant
or a cooperative’s 7d plant. The 7d and 7e plants have a great advantage of form over substance,
however. Milk delivered to those plants gets credit for producer “touch base” purposes, and does
not count against the diversion limits of the cooperative. Therefore, I use “paper pooling” to
refer to all milk that participates in the pool but is not delivered to a distributing plant. The
objective of proposals in this hearing, and predecessor hearings, is to reduce the volume of milk
that is pooled on paper for some but not all market participants. As discussed below, this would
have the effect of foreclosing pool access to some milk, and enhance the value of “paper” held
by those who remain on the pool.
Vetne (2005) and others, on behalf of several cooperatives with a minor share of
regulated markets to the west, have criticized these proposed changes in prior hearings from the
perspective of producer equity, the legislative intent of the 1937 Agricultural Marketing
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Agreement Act that established market orders, the Nourse Commission (1962) study of market
orders, and the relevant case law. The essence of that argument is that federal market orders are
not intended to limit access of non-fluid use milk to a market order pool by non-economic means
such as diversion limits. Even under market orders, transportation economics, plant location, and
location of raw milk determine the farm gate value of milk (Vetne 2002b, , Black 1935, Cassels
1937, Pratt et al. 1998). All farmers are to share in the pooled value of milk sales across fluid and
manufacturing classes of use on an equitable basis based upon the components of their milk and
the location of their market or their customer’s market.
To date there has been relatively little discussion in the hearings or post-hearing briefs
about the impact of the proposed reductions in division limits upon the allocative efficiency of
milk marketing channels. That is the issue I will address in this paper. Federal market orders
were never intended to contribute to the monopolization of milk market channels either by
cooperatives or proprietary firms or by such firms acting in concert, although orders have been
used to create and maintain monopolies in the past (U.S. DOJ, 1977), and continue to provide
powerful tools to stifle competition by increasing costs or reducing revenue for competitors.
The unique potential for federal milk order pooling rules to be used by a dominant
cooperative to disadvantage a competitor was recently illustrated when DFA’s National Dariy
Holdings processing company proposed a merger with HP Hood in New England, with DFA or
its designee to provide the full supply of milk to the merged Hood plants.

If the merger had

gone through as NDH/DFA intended, Agri-Mark cooperative would have lost its primary
distributing plant outlet and therefore its primary source of federal order pooling base for
member milk used to produce Cabot cheese and other manufactured products, as explained in
testimony for the Senate Judiciary Committee by Robert Wellington, Agri-Mark’s economist,
3

attached hereto as Exhibit 3. Faced with loss of pool access for much of its milk supply, AgriMark would probably have joined forces with DFA, as did its sister cooperatives, Dairylea and
St. Albans, in the marketing agency in common, Dairy Marketing Services (DMS). This incident
is an example of vertical foreclosure. The merger in the processing market created competitive
problems in the milk assembly market.1
At this hearing, as in prior proceedings, I submit that one of USDA’s most important
decision making functions in addressing “paper pooling issues” is to consider the competitive
impact of proposed rules. If at all possible, USDA should avoid rule amendments that would
contribute to the acquisition or exercise of market power by dominant milk assembly
cooperatives and dominant milk processors. Such firms may acquire market power through
competition on the merits and/or economies of scale and scope; however, they should not acquire
it via violation of antitrust law or by administrative fiat in a regulatory process such as this one.
II. Impact Analysis
I have read several post hearing briefs from the recent Central Market Order hearing
(Vetne 2005a, Vetne 2005b, Beshore, English) and have read the factual documentation
requested from the Mideast Market Administrator by the parties participating in this hearing
(DFA/MMPA, White Eagle, Dean). In response to a request from Dairy Farmers of America
(DFA) and Michigan Milk Producers Association (MMPA) and a request from White Eagle
Federation et al. the Mideast Order Market Administrator completed an impact analysis of the
proposed reduction in diversion limits for October 2004 (DFA/MMPA) and for all months of

1

Hood allayed Agri-Mark’s concerns by agreeing to continue to procure fluid from them after the merger.
However, vertical foreclosure and its impacts on an independent cooperative such as Agri-Mark remains
an issue. Read on and see Cotterill in attached Exhibit 2.
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2003-2004 (White Eagle). Table 1 reproduces the quantitative impact analysis of the reduction in
diversion limitations for October 2004.2
Table 1: Mideast Market Administrator’s
Estimated Impact on PPD of 10 Percent Reduction in Diversion Limitations: October 2004

Pooled Pounds

Estimated Overdirverted
Pounds @ 50% Limitation

Adjusted Pooled
Pounds

1,545,776,665

63,800,000

1,481,976,665

Producer Price Differential
As Pooled
Adjusted Change
$0.73

$0.75

$0.02

Source: Mideast Market Administrator's Office, DFA/MMPA Request No. 21

The market pool was 1.545 billion pounds and the 10% reduction in diversion limits would have
reduced that pool by 63.8 million pounds. This 4.1% reduction would increase the producer
price differential (and “blend” or statistical uniform price) only 2 cents per hundredweight. This
suggests that the policy change is trivial. Proponents should then be relatively unconcerned
about this proposal. However, the projected 2 cent impact on producer prices ignores the
competitive consequences of the proposed changes on the performance of raw milk assembly,
fluid milk processing, and ultimately retail fluid milk markets. Proponent’s competitive benefit
from their proposal, and corresponding disbenefit to competitors, is more profound than a 2-cent
impact on the producer blend price.
Precise quantitative analysis of these competitive impacts is not possible because the
necessary data are not currently in the public domain. I requested market share data for fluid
bottlers and the handlers that supply them in the Mideast Market Area from the Market
Administrator. Such information is confidential and unavailable from USDA sources for
hearings such as this one. Industry sources, however, suggest that Dairy Farmers of America
(DFA) and its partner cooperatives in Capper-Volstead sanctioned marketing-agencies-in2

Depooling did not occur during October 2004 so this analysis is not affected by that issue.
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common or cooperative federations dominate raw milk sales in the Mideast Order. These
agencies are: (1) Dairy Marketing Services (“DMS”), a Section 9c cooperative federation
dominated by DFA with fluid milk sales throughout the Mideast; (2) the Mideast Marketing
Agency (MEMA), a combination of DFA/DMS, Foremost Farms, Land O’ Lakes, and NFO in
the Mideast area other than Michigan, and (3) the Producer Equalization Committee (PEC)
consisting primarily of DFA and Michigan Milk Producers Association (MMPA) for sales in the
state of Michigan.. For example, in September 2004 the three largest cooperatives marketed
1.095 billion pounds of raw milk, fully 82% of the Mideast (Federal Order 33) milk pool (FMO
Statistical Response to White Eagle Federation Request, this Hearing, Table 17). One of the top
three is White Eagle Federation, with pooled milk of about 145 million pounds, as explained in
testimony by Jeff Leeman, leaving DFA/DMS and MMPA with 950 million pounds. The
remaining cooperatives pooled 154 million pounds. However, the testimony at this hearing
reveals that of the remaining cooperatives on the handler list (Exhibit 6, Table 1), Dairylea,
Foremost Farms, NFO, Prairie Farms, and Upstate all marketed their milk through one of the
DFA/DMS-dominated agencies in common. Their reported 9(c) milk, therefore, should be
added to the total of 950 million pounds of DFA/DMS/MMPA, bringing the pooled milk within
the control of these dominant suppliers to about 82% of the market. Only Lanco and Steamburg
cooperatives are not accounted for, and I understand that they pool a negligible volume of milk
in Order 33.
At the fluid processing level, large consolidated processors dominate the fluid milk
industry. These include: (1) Dean Foods, which has a long term strategic alliance (full supply
contracts) with DFA, and operates 12 plants in the Mideast and processes an estimated 250-300
million pounds of milk per month at these plants, (2) National Dairy Holdings (2 plants) which is
6

50% owned by DFA, and (3) Kroger, the region’s largest grocery retailer, with Mideast
distributing plants and an estimated 120 million pounds of receipts per month. Kroger is also
fully supplied by the DFA/DMS and MMPA or their marketing agencies in common.
Map-Tables 8a through 8e of Exhibits 7 and 11 show 41 pool distributing plants
remaining in Order 33 and their locations. Twelve of the plants on the Market Administrator’s
list are very small, having an average of 2 million pounds per month of milk receipts. (White
Eagle Requested Data, Table 1). DFA/DMS and its marketing agencies in common provide full
supplies to about 23 of the remaining 29 large and very large Order 33 distributing plants
according to testimony by witnesses at this hearing on March 8, 2005

The White Eagle

Federation provides supplies milk to 4 distributing plants. The total receipts of milk by all
distributing plants, in million pounds, were 637 during December 2003, 630 in May 2004, and
659 in December 2004, including 22 – 25 million pounds of “other source” (nonpool) bulk milk
(Id. Table 3). Producer milk received at distributing plants during October 2004 was 610 million
pounds. (Id. Table 7).

These receipts represent the aggregate pooling base for all market

participants.
The largest cooperatives, DFA/DMS and MMPA, and their agency in common partners
have sufficient pooling base to be unaffected by the proposed 10 points reduction in the
diversion limit, as I understand the testimony of Mr. Gallagher and Mr. Rasch. Yet if 63.8
million pounds of manufacturing milk to nonpool plants is cut out of the pool, the corresponding
amount of distributing plant receipts affected is 127.6 million pounds of milk. Currently, 127.6
pounds of distributing plant receipts would allow 1.5x127.6= 191.4 million pounds of
manufacturing milk into the pool. As proposed, that same fluid milk base would allow only
127.6 million pounds of milk into the pool (assumes a reduction of the diversion limit from 60 to
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50%, i.e. manufacturing milk pooled can only be 60% or post change 50% of the pool). This
reduction in ability to pool milk makes it more costly for any supplier with a limited share of the
fluid market to supply Mideast fluid plants. Since distributing plant receipts for the October 2004
pool was 610 million pounds, the proposed change in the diversion limit potentially affects
127.6/610= 20.9% of the fluid market. Note that this is just a bit more than the market share of
small cooperatives and independent producers not represented by the DFA led marketing
agencies (100 – 82 = 18%). These are the suppliers who are targeted by proposal two and who
will be short of pooling base to meet the proposed change.
Plants supplied by White Eagle will also be disadvantaged by the lowering of the
diversion limits because the ability to pool diverted milk has value to the plant that provides
pooling base and to the producers who negotiate to supply the plant and thereby gain pooling
base. Producers that would supply the 68 million pounds of milk withdrawn from the pool under
Proposal No. 2 are economically disadvantaged in a direct fashion. Moreover, farmers who are
part of the DFA led supply system may be also be disadvantaged because of a reduction in
competition for their raw milk, i.e. a reduction in milk marketing alternatives.
Let’s address the impact on farmers first. Salop recently described a phenomenon that he
labels “predatory overbuying” as follows:
Predatory overbuying consists of overbuying inputs as a predatory strategy to
cause buyer-side competitors in the input market to exit from the market or
permanently shrink their capacity in order to gain monopsony power in the input
market (Salop, 2005).
The reduction in diversion limits is not necessarily predatory, but it may be employed as a
predatory tool and has a similar impact on the buying structure of the raw milk assembly market
in the Mideast milkshed. The DFA-led buying combinations in this market already are the
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dominant buyers and the change in the rule limits the ability of other milk assemblers in the
milkshed to compete for farmer’s milk because it reduces their ability to qualify for the pool.
Now examining the impact on milk assemblers competition in the sale of milk to fluid
bottlers in this market area, Salop describes a second consequence from an increase in buyers
market power such as that arising from the proposed reduction in diversion limits.
Raising Rivals’ Costs (RRC) overbuying consists of overbuying inputs as an
exclusionary strategy to raise rivals’ input costs and thereby gain market power
in the output market (Salop, 2005)
The impact on milk assemblers of reducing the diversion limits is equivalent to overbuying.
Assemblers that are not in the DFA sphere of influence have higher costs to qualify for the pool.
This suggests that they must charge fluid bottlers higher prices. Consider the experience of
Central Equity Cooperatives in the Central Marketing Order.
The absence of fluid milk marketing opportunities is illustrated by Central Equity
Coop, whose producer-members are clustered near the intersection of Oklahoma,
Missouri, and Kansas state boundaries. In order to pool its member milk, Central
Equity sells milk to Wells Dairy in Iowa, about 400 miles away. This long
distance hauling, obviously, would not take place if a closer distributing plant (or
cooperative pool plant) were made available to Central Equity (Vetne, 2005b).
The primary strategic alternatives for cooperative assemblers such as Central Equity in the
Central order and for White Eagle in the Mideast order are to merge with DFA or to affiliate with
their agency-in common and pay for access to their dominant raw fluid supply system.
Fluid milk bottlers [distributors] who are not in the DFA sphere of influence also face
these higher costs and their ability to compete in the packaged fluid milk market is reduced.
Moreover, switching to the DFA led supply system may not be a viable alternative. This is true
to the extent that the web of vertical strategic alliances favors the largest firms at each level of
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the milk market channel. This insight also suggests that smaller fluid processors currently
supplied by the DFA led system may not be receiving the same terms as larger processors.
Vertical strategic alliances between large milk cooperatives and the nation’s largest fluid
processors are often touted as enhancing logistic efficiency. If that is indeed the case then they
should compete on the merits and not seek advantages by changing market order regulations.
Again recall the estimated 2 cent per hundred weight advantage of this proposed 10% point
change in the diversion limit. Clearly if the large coops and distributors want this change it must
be more important to them then 2 cents.
There is another side to vertical strategic alliances that suggests it is. Vertical strategic
alliances between milk cooperatives and fluid processors and between processors and leading
supermarket retailers in many regions of the country lead to vertical foreclosure games that
benefit the dominant partners at each stage of the system {Wellington, (attached Exhibit 3),
Cotterill (Exhibit 2) Cotterill, et al., 2003, and Miyakawa, 2004}.
These foreclosure games are of two general types. The dominant players at each stage
can use their power to benefit their vertical alliance partners by imposing costs on their partners’
rivals -- for example DFA/DMS, MEMA and DFA/MMPA and PEC at the milk assembly stage
in the Mideast Market Area, Dean Foods and NDH (DFA) at the fluid processing stage, and
Kroger or other dominant supermarket chains at retail in local retail market areas. Processors
can, for example, benefit dominant retailers by making only high cost milk available to would be
retail competitors forcing them “out” of the retail market.
Alternatively, as we have seen in the New England Market Area, a system of vertical
alliances can impose higher costs on rivals and implement a price leadership scheme at retail
(Cotterill 2005, relevant sections attached here as Exhibit 2). The result is higher retail prices
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that are shared by all key players in the channel. Smaller fluid processors and smaller retailers
that have higher costs are not about to challenge the dominant firms’ price leadership because
these firms have the ability to discipline them in a price war or in the non-price dimension.
Recall dominant firms have lower costs throughout the system due to their buying power (and if
approved in this hearing due to regulatory impacts). As Wellington (Exhibit 3), Miyakawa 2004,
and Cotterill (Exhibit 2) explain it is entirely possible that vertical foreclosure games can be
played against farmers in raw milk markets.
DFA and its agencies-in-common most likely claim superior milk assembly efficiencies
as the source of their competitive advantage.3 On their point, the Dairy Marketing Services
(DMS) website states:
“Dairy Marketing Services (DMS) is a milk marketing organization formed for
the purpose of creating efficiencies and reducing costs of milk assembly, field
services, and transportation. It serves farmers by working to streamline the milk
marketing system, and serves processors by being better able to meet their
needs.” {http://www.dairymarketingservices.com}
It also, however, is entirely possible that their dominant position is based upon their vertical
contracts, and their participation in vertical collusion schemes such as those contemplated and
observed in New England milk markets.
In conclusion, I remain skeptical and would recommend that the Secretary not approve
Proposal 2 until a more careful analysis of the competitive impact demonstrates that anticompetitive consequences -- upon nondominant and small business processors, upon the small
cooperatives who assemble milk and small business farmers that supply them,

and upon

nondominant retailers and consumers -- do not offset the two cent per hundred weight advantage
of this proposed change. If large milk assemblers and fluid processors are efficient in a spatial

3

See Cotterill (1989) for analysis of commodity bargaining cooperatives as opposed to efficiency driven
integrated cooperatives.
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milk economy why do they need this regulatory change to benefit them and the farmers that they
serve? The answer, as implied in testimony by Mr. Gallagher, lies not in the benefit of a 2-cent
gain to DFA/DMS members, but rather in the harm caused by the proposed rules to DFA
competitors who stand to lose $0.73 per hundredweight PPD on 63.8 million pounds of milk
forced to exit the market if the proposals are adopted.
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4. Vertical market power
The sequence of markets and industries between farmers and consumers, also has
important implications for performance. As in the horizontal dimension the two primary
dimensions of performance are efficiency and market power. Here, we retreat from the new
Institutional Economics of contracts and focus squarely on open market pricing in a channel that
has oligopostic manufacturing and retailing industries.
4.1.

Vertical pricing games [DELETED]

4.2. Private label pricing strategy: competitive retailers [DELETED]
4.3. Countervailing or coalescing power
With his countervailing power hypotheses J. K. Galbraith posed a different solution to
manufacturer power. He argued that the solution to power on one side of the market was to
develop power to develop on the other side. The obvious examples of his time were labor unions
that sought to countervail powerful large corporate employers, and agricultural bargaining
cooperatives. In the resulting bilateral monopoly situation price and other terms of trade are
indeterminant but for bargaining. Walter Adams and others, however, argued that concentration
on both sides of a market would produce coalescing power, i.e. the adversaries would combine to
affectively increase the exercise of power against others in markets up or down the market
channel.
Dobson and Waterson analyze these two competing hypotheses for the UK supermarket
industry. Their theoretical analysis begins with the premise that manufacturers and supermarkets
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are locked in a bilateral monopoly situation in the wholesale market, i.e. countervailing power
exists. They demonstrate that coalescing power is the outcome and consumers pay higher prices
when supermarkets also have market power in the retail market (Dobson and Waterson, 1997 p.
428). Dobson and Waterson did not analyze the symmetric issue for the raw product market,
however if manufacturers have buyer power there one would expect a symmetric result.
Coalescing power between retailers and manufacturers would lower raw product prices to
farmers.
4.4. Vertical market foreclosure and price leadership
There also is an important dynamic dimension to the exercise of market power in a
vertical channel by retailers and manufacturers. The growth of supermarket chains to market
dominance can reinforce anti-competitive conduct in the retail market via strategic moves in the
vertical dimension. For example in Toys R Us v. FTC, 221F3d 928 (7th Circuit, 2000) the court
found that this leading toy retailer was able to require toy manufacturers to offer less favorable
terms of trade to other toy retailers, thereby hurting its rivals and reinforcing its market power at
retail.
Consider a second vertical strategic game that may be more pernicious because it shares
power gains with rival firms in the channel, and thus may more likely escape detection and
persistently damage consumers. A dominant retail firm can extract cost concessions from a food
processor that effectively force a dominant processor to charge other retailers higher wholesale
prices. Yet now rather than use its cost advantage to start a price war at retail to damage
competitors, the advantaged dominant retailer elevates prices so that competitors, whose costs
are higher, make more not less profits than before. The dominant firm’s price leadership
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scheme, also increases its own profits and the profits of the processor profits (from higher priced
sale to the retail fringe firms). The result is coalescing power against consumers.
This situation has existed in the New England fluid milk market since 2000 (Cotterill
2003 et al.) Royal Ahold via its Stop and Shop supermarket chain has had a dominant market
share at retail (50 per cent) due primarily to horizontal mergers during the 1990’s. In 2000 it
closed its milk plant and negotiated a 20 year strategic alliance with the Dean Foods milk
processing company that thereafter supplied over 80 per cent of New England supermarket milk.
In 2003 Stop and Shop paid the raw market price plus 53 cents per gallon for milk
delivered into its stores. Competing supermarket chains pay 10 cents per gallon more for the
same supply. Stop and Shop has led prices up so that retail margins over the past five years are
$1.50 per gallon. In store marginal costs are 20-25 cents per gallon and fully allocated costs are
40-50 cents per gallon. Therefore all supermarket chains are capturing approximately $1 per
gallon as a power premium and the processor earns a share as well. This vertical collusion game
escapes Robinson-Patman prosecution in the U.S. because the cost discount granted to the
powerful buyer does not damage other retailers.
Although not perfectly verified many market observers believe this coalescing power was
also used against farmers. Big Y, a large regional supermarket chain that initially opted to
receive its milk from the number three fluid processor recently threatened to switch to the
dominant processor if it could not pay a lower wholesale price. The demand was so substantial
that the processor went to its farmer cooperative supplier and demanded a lower raw milk price,
otherwise it claimed it would lose the retail account and go out of business. Agri-Mark, the
threatened regional co-op with annual sales of over $500 million and over 1,400 members could
not sell to Dean Foods because a competing national cooperative has a nationwide full supply
6

contract with that dominant processor. To keep their fluid market, in this situation, farmers in
the regional cooperative cut price. This is positive proof that when it comes to the exercise of
buyer power against farmers, the truth is often found in analysis of the institutional details in
relevant antitrust markets rather than aggregate national analysis.
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